01 / About
A seminar for learning how the argument works.
The NET Seminar is an online reading group for classic and frontier work on economic networks and related theory. Each session is led by one presenter and may focus on a single paper or a small set of closely related papers.
The goal is not merely to survey a literature. Presenters are encouraged to assume limited prior familiarity and develop a careful, self-contained account of a reusable analytical tool, technique, or economic mechanism.
The appropriate level of technical detail is left to the presenter. A session may explain a proof and its intuition, or isolate the central idea and clarify why the paper makes an important contribution.
02 / Format
Detailed presentations and active discussion.
- Each participant is expected to lead one session, using a paper from the tentative list below or another relevant choice.
- Presenters may use detailed slides, written notes, or live derivations. The sessions are recorded for internal review.
- Participants are encouraged to attend other sessions and contribute questions, alternative interpretations, and technical discussion.
Working papers are welcome.
A presenter may discuss recent working papers or present their own ongoing research. These sessions are intended for constructive criticism, identifying open questions, and sharpening the argument before wider circulation.
03 / Details
Fall 2026
- Time
- Mondays at 7:00 p.m. China Standard Time
- Venue
- WeChat group; contact either organizer to join
- Updates
- Individual sessions will be announced in advance
- Contact
-
Sijie Wang: stillwang@bjtu.edu.cn
Guopeng Li: guopenglieco@163.com
04 / Readings
Tentative Reading List
The list is open to classic and recent papers on networks, including published articles and working papers.
-
Dynamic Opinion Aggregation: Long-Run Stability and Disagreement
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Roberto Corrao, and Giacomo Lanzani
Review of Economic Studies, 91(3), 1406-1447, 2024
-
A Shocking Reversal: Flipping Complements and Substitutes in Network Games
Evan Sadler and Steve Yeh
Working paper, 2026; SSRN 6109228
-
Incentive Design with Spillovers
Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, and Anant Shah
arXiv:2411.08026, 2024
Additional papers, presenters, and session dates will be added during the semester.